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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to understand the underlying factors that led to the 
sustained stagnation of the Japanese economy from 1991. It covers the causes of the 
bubble that emerged in 1980s, the government’s intervention to slow the over heated 
economy down, and then government’s failed effort to revive it by implementing 
countercyclical stimulus policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lost Decades of Japan 
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The Lost Decade is referred to the time after the asset price bubble's collapse within the 
Japanese economy; the economy gradually slid into recession and has not yet recovered. 
The term originally referred to the years 1991 to 2000, but recently the decade from 2001 
to 2010 has also been added, the combined period of 1990-2010 is coined as the Lost 
Years or the Lost Decades of Japan. 
 
The asset bubble that arose in 1980s was attributed to a combination of very high land 
values and very low interest rates. It led to a situation where cheap credit was easily 
available. The Japanese businesses and households started borrowing large sums of 
money to invest in domestic and foreign securities. The Japanese stock index (Nikkei) 
rose its all-time high on December 29, 1989. The Japanese government issued 100-year 
bonds to match the yields from housing, stocks, and bonds. Looking back, during the 
height of the bubble, the real estate sector was extremely over-valued. Tokyo's Ginza 
district was one of the Japans costliest areas in 1989, with some properties fetching over 
US$1.5 million per square meter. After evaluating the situation, the Japanese Finance 
Ministry decided to curb the bubble by sharply raising the interest rates in late 1989. This 
sudden rise in interest rates led to the sudden decline of the stock market, finally ending 
the asset bubble. Japanese started facing the debt crisis; toxic assets started accumulating, 
which fueled the banking sector crisis. Massive bailouts were required to save the 
unsustainable banks; waves of consolidation and nationalization of banks took place. 
Many Japanese companies were burdened with massive debts, paralyzing 
their investment and growth abilities. 
 
According to Paul Krugman the Lost Decades of Japan were due to liquidity trap, too 
much saving on the part of both Japanese consumers and firms led to the slowdown of the 
entire economy. According to him the land and stock market prices tripled during the 
prosperous 1980s. Mr. Krugman believes that Japanese have high personal savings rates, 
partly due to their demographics of an aging population, and culture. This enabled 
Japanese companies to borrow from traditional bank supported by the banking networks, 
as opposed to issuing commercial paper, or raising money by issuing stock or bonds. He 
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wrote: "The cozy relationship of corporations to banks and the implicit guarantee of a 
taxpayer bailout of bank deposits created a significant moral hazard problem, leading to 
an atmosphere of crony capitalism and reduced lending standards. Japan's banks lent 
more, with less regard for quality of the borrower, than anyone else's. In doing so they 
helped inflate the bubble economy to grotesque proportions."  
 
During the late 1980s, the time when the asset bubble was rising, unusual phenomena 
were observed within the real estate sector: 
• Those who had land became richer, and those who didn't, had little chance of 
buying, leading to the sense of inequality and social injustice in the society.  
• Vacant lands were considered much more valuable due to their liquidity than the 
lands with buildings on them. That incentivized Yakuza (the Japanese mafia) 
to illegally demolish buildings, and force landowners to sell their lands. 
• Mushrooming of unoccupied office buildings in urban areas accelerated. 
• Excessive numbers of amusement parks, hotels, tourist attractions, and resorts 
were being developed. The assumption was that these facilities would be potential 
sources of large revenues. 
 
Countercyclical Stimulus 
 
After encountering the meltdown of their economy, in 1991 the Japanese government 
decided to stimulate it by enacting countercyclical fiscal policies, and by increasing 
social security payouts. During 1990s the Japanese fiscal spending became unrestrained 
to the level that it beat all other advanced industrialized countries. Prior to 1991, the 
government spending (outlays) in Japan accounted for just 31.6 percent of the nation's 
GDP, one of the lowest among members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) [Ronald D. Utt, December 2008]. Once the interest rates were 
raised and the economy started sliding downwards, Japanese government started 
spending on infrastructure projects in order to stimulate the economy. After maintaining a 
relatively high level of public investment for several years, Japan’s highest spending 
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came in 1995 and 1996, peaking at over 43 trillion yen, or more than 8.9 percent of GDP, 
in first quarter of 1996. The year 1997 was the turning point of Japan’s efforts to 
stimulate its economy through public spending. Japan began steadily curbing its spending 
since then. Public investment in Japan has since fallen to under 4 percent of GDP. 
 
Spending on Infrastructure Projects 
 
As a 2001 Heritage Foundation report noted, a substantial portion of the Japan's stimulus 
spending was focused on infrastructure. During 1992-2000, Japanese government 
implemented ten separate fiscal spending packages in which public infrastructure projects 
was a major component. The additional spending on the infrastructure component 
amounted to 30.4 trillion yen, ($254 billion). The report also stated that Japan's 
government spent too much on roads and bridges, and not enough in the areas of 
education, social services, technology (research and development), which, other studies 
have proved deliver more long term benefits than infrastructural expenditure. “It is not 
enough just to hire workers to dig holes and then fill them in again,” said Toshihiro Ihori, 
an economics professor at the University of Tokyo. “One lesson from Japan is that public 
works get the best results when they create something useful for the future.” 
 
According to the Japanese Cabinet Office, Japan spent $6.3 trillion on construction 
oriented public infrastructure investment between 1991 and September of 2009. The 
spending was highest in year 1995 and remained high until the early 2000s. After 2000s, 
the spending was reduced taking into account the growing concerns of the country's 
rising budget deficit and debt. During the high spending years, the regional economies 
had started depending on the government leaders in Tokyo for jobs. The government 
leaders in Tokyo were the members of Liberal Democratic Party; they used government 
spending as their tool to buy rural votes and converted their nation into a public-works-
based welfare state. According to Fackler, most Japanese economists believe that their 
country “spent more than enough money, but wasted too much of it on roads to nowhere 
and other unneeded projects”. 
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In his survey of public works in the 1990s, Dr. Ihori of the University of Tokyo 
concluded that the spending on the infrastructural projects created almost no additional 
economic growth. He found that crowding out of private investment started taking place 
due to massive government spending. According to him, the only beneficiaries of the job 
creation were the construction industry workers concentrated in the rural areas. His study 
also concluded that too much of the spending went in overbuilding an already heavily 
developed nation. Critics of these projects also said that, spending decisions were made 
behind closed doors by politicians, construction industry personnel, and bureaucrats, 
often considering political and personal benefits over the countries economic 
development. 
 
A cost benefit study conducted by a nonprofit policy research group, Japan Institute for 
Local Government in 1998, found that “every 1 trillion yen ($11.2 billion), spent on 
social services like care for the elderly and monthly pension payments added 1.64 trillion 
yen in growth. Financing for schools and education delivered an even bigger boost of 
1.74 trillion yen, the report found. But every 1 trillion yen spent on infrastructure projects 
in the 1990s increased Japan’s gross domestic product, a measure of its overall economic 
size, by only 1.37 trillion yen, mainly by creating jobs and other improvements like 
reducing travel times.” Based on the above study, an advanced economy such as Japan 
should have spent stimulus money on higher-paying (long term) human capital, and on 
knowledge-based professions such as health care, technology, and education. 
 
“In hindsight, Japan should have built public works that address the problems it faces 
today, like aging, energy, and food sources,” said Takehiko Hobo, a professor emeritus of 
public finance at Shimane University in Matsue. “This obsession with building roads is a 
holdover from an earlier era.” The fruits of that obsession are apparent across Shimane, a 
rural prefecture about the size of Delaware where Hamada is located. Each town seems to 
have its own art museum, domed athletic center and government-built tourist attraction 
like the Nima Sand Museum, a giant hourglass in a glass pyramid. The prefecture, with 
740,000 residents, even has three commercial airports able to handle jets, including the 
$250 million Hagi-Iwami Airport, which sits eerily empty with just two flights per day. 
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In Hamada, residents say the city’s most visible “hakomono,” the Japanese equivalent of 
“white elephant,” was its own bridge to nowhere, the $70 million Marine Bridge, whose 
1,006-foot span sat almost completely devoid of traffic. Built in 1999, the bridge links the 
city to a small, sparsely populated island already connected by a shorter bridge. “The 
bridge? It’s a dud,” said Masahiro Shimada, 70, a retired city official who was fishing 
near the port. “Maybe we could use it for bungee jumping,” he joked. 
 
Koichi Matsuoka, a retired professor of policy at the University of Shimane in Hamada, 
said, "useless projects like the Marine Bridge were the reason that years of huge 
spending had brought few long-term benefits here". While Shimane has had the highest 
per capita spending on public works in Japan for the last 18 years, thanks to powerful 
local politicians like the deceased former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita. Its per capita 
annual income of $26,000 ranked it 40th among Japan’s 47 prefectures, he said. 
According to him, the spending had left Shimane $11 billion in debt, twice the size of the 
prefectural government’s annual budget. According to Peter Dyloco, the road builders 
laid down more than 1.1 million kilometers of asphalt across the country, more than four 
times the length of Great Britain’s expressways combined. “It is, and the cost of 
upholding Japan’s public infrastructure is extravagant beyond belief. Japan spends an 
average of five percent (or $236 billion USD) of its national GDP funding maintenance 
projects from Kyushu to Hokkaido. Compare that figure to that of the United States, 
which dedicates little more than two percent of its national GDP towards the same thing, 
or to Great Britain’s measly 2.5 percent. To fund for the difference, road tolls and vehicle 
taxes – the most expensive of any developed country, continue to drain exorbitant 
amounts of money from the average taxpayer.” [Peter Dyloco April 2011] 
 
Japan has ninety-eight airports, and ninety percent of them are not profitable. Redundant 
highways connect the same cities with no significant differences in the travel time and 
distances. According to Peter Dyloco, at the same time most of the important projects 
related to the improvement in country's educational system, and social services remain 
ignored. The overwhelming majority of the infrastructural spending is serving the 
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interests of the individuals involved in construction project industry itself. Most of this 
spending is attributed to the pork barrel spending. 
 
Japan “didn’t do a good job of timing the expenditures,” said Michael Smitka, a professor 
of economics at Washington and Lee University who has focused on Japan for nearly 30 
years. He claims that Japan’s haphazard, poorly coordinated, and often ill-timed 
implementation of infrastructure spending, prevented it from having more impact. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party that was in power in Japan throughout the decade had a strong 
rural base, resulting in political pressure to ensuring sparsely populated prefectures got 
their piece of the pie. Spending was not necessarily directed to the regions where 
economic needs were greatest; in fact, the procedure was to spread funds evenly across 
all prefectures, having no mechanism to target funds to projects in high-density urban 
areas. Rural districts gained disproportionate funding, often to be spent on projects that 
were little needed (small-scale Japanese Bridges to Nowhere). The projects themselves 
were often ill conceived, designed with more of an eye on their political costs and 
benefits than on their societal and economic desirability. The result was expenditures that 
had almost no social value beyond the work created by the projects they funded. 
 
The Japan's government continued to inject money into subsidies for local governments 
and municipalities, encouraging them to take on additional debt, which they simply could 
not repay. The cost benefit analyses were based on hopelessly optimistic assumptions and 
predictions. Tremendous amounts of tax (yen) were earmarked for maintenance and 
construction initiatives. According to Timon Singh, “The Ibraki airport, whilst the Japan 
Airlines are struggling with bankruptcy and increases in losses, comes the news that the 
country has opened its 98th airport... however it only offers one flight a day”. “The 
Ibaraki airport cost $220 million to build and due to its 'limited' services, it has been 
blasted as a massive waste of public expenditure, especially as it's 50 miles north of 
Tokyo. It was conceived as a hub for budget carriers but cutbacks worldwide meant that 
the airport was practically deserted on its first day” [Timon Singh]. 
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The Reform and Further Decline 
 
The government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) started to implement 
reform measures, such as curbing highway construction expenditure, privatizing the 
Japanese postal services, and reforming the banking system. But in 2001, global economy 
suffered more shocks caused by the terrorist attacks on the United States, leading to the 
global slowdown and the Dot com bubble burst, that led to further opposition to the 
Prime Minister's fiscal conservatism.  
 
At present, Japan's public debt is more than 200 percent of its annual gross domestic 
product, largest of any nation in the world.  In 2009, the gross public debt exceeded 
170% of GDP, making Japan the most indebted nation among major world 
economies. Large budget deficits and government debt since the 2009 global recession, 
followed by earthquake and tsunami in March of 2011 caused even further damage to an 
already sluggish economy. In August of 2011, Moody's lowered Japan's long-term 
sovereign debt rating one notch from Aa3 to Aa2 in accordance with the size of the 
country's deficit and debt level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
References: 
 
Michael, Skocpol. Finding the Lessons of Japan’s Lost Decade: February 17, 2009 
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/newsletters09/pdfs/Finding_the_Lessons_of_Japans
_Lost_Decade.pdf 
 
Peter Dyloco, FEATURE:The Excesses of Japan’s Construction Industry, April 8, 2011 
http://savingjapan.net/2011/04/08/featurethe-excesses-of-japans-construction-industry/ 
 
Martin Fackler. Japan’s Big-Works Stimulus Is Lesson: February 5, 2009 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/world/asia/06japan.html?pagewanted=all 
 
Peter Dyloco. Japan’s infrastructure excesses: April 11, 2011 
http://injapan.gaijinpot.com/2011/04/11/japans-infrastructure-excesses/ 
 
Timon Singh, Japan's wasteful infrastructure spending 
http://www.asianinfrastructure.com/news/japans-wasteful-infrastructure-spending/ 
 
Ronald Utt . Learning from Japan: Infrastructure Spending Won't Boost the Economy: 
December 16, 2008 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/12/learning-from-japan-infrastructure-
spending-wont-boost-the-economy 
 
MLIT Japan. Land Prices in Japan from 1974 to 2007: 
http://tochi.mlit.go.jp/english/6-05.pdf 
 
Adam Zemel, Lessons from Japan: How to Avoid A "Lost Decade" in America February 
9, 2009 
http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/02/how_to_avoid_a_lost_decade_in.shtml 
 
 
 10
Lost Decade (Japan) wiki article: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lost_Decade_%28Japan%29 
 
Barry Nielsen. The Lost Decade: Lessons From Japan's Real Estate Crisis: Jul 23, 2008 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/japan-1990s-credit-crunch-liquidity-
trap.asp#axzz1bmjblAJW 
 
  
 
 
